The notion of political consumption has two implications: First, consumers wield some kind of power that they can use to effect social change through the marketplace. Second, political consumption refers to and somehow combines the rationalities of two subsystems, politics and the economy. Yet regarding their everyday, highly individualized shopping decisions, consumers do not appear to command a great deal of power. What kind of influence, then, can individual economic decisions have on corporate policies? Is that influence robust enough to attribute power to consumers? And if consumers do indeed have power, how can we conceive the implied translation of political concerns into the monetary logic of the economy? An answer to those questions needs to take into account the societal context of political consumption. This paper analyses how political consumerism relates to the functional differentiation of modern society and how a sociological concept of the market can help us understand its efficacy.
Nothing could be more obvious than the fact that consumers in a modern market economy can and indeed have to choose. For almost any extant and imagined need, there is not only one option but often a staggering variety of brands and commodities. Nowhere is the astonishment about the 'immense accumulation of commodities' (Marx, 1961: 15) more appropriate than in a modern supermarket. It seems to be a characteristic feature of market economies that there is no scarcity of commodities (like in socialist systems), but of consumers (Luhmann, 2002: 44) . If the consumer faces an abundance of commodities on the one hand and budget restrictions on the other, she therefore has to make a choice. Yet this standard description of the consumer, which informs both common sense and economics, is not without its problems.
It is hardly surprising that social scientists should insist that the free choice of the consumer is not so free after all. Once again confirming Duesenberry's quip that 'economics is all about choice, while sociology is about why people have no choices ', Miller (1987; argues that consumption is properly conceived as lack of choice rather than its abundance. Consumers, after all, only have a 'secondary relationship' to the services and goods they buy. They depend on others to produce commodities for them -and thus on their choices.
What does that mean for the 'power' of the consumer? If the consumer wields any power at all it must derive from the ability to choose among a range of options. Yet if we have to regard those options as secondary derivatives of the choices of producers, what remains of the power and influence of the consumer? Is it a mere illusion? Or does it exist, if only in a limited and secondary form? In this paper, I suggest that we need to go beyond a simplistic notion that derives consumer power -the prime tool of 'political consumption' -from the existence or lack of choice. Not the individual consumer exercises power but a rather fragile and ephemeral 'collective' of aggregated and communicated choice. The sociologically interesting question is not whether there are 'real' choices or not, but how a collective choice can be simulated and communicated in an atomistic market economy. Put differently, how can a political social process (collective decision-making) inform the individual choices of economic agents?
The paper proceeds in four steps. The first section discusses the relationship between power and consumption. In the following section I turn to a major obstacle to political consumerism in modern society: the differentiation of societal subsystems and the 'privatization' of consumption choices. The third and fourth sections then show how political consumption is made possible by social movements that 'collectivize' private choice and use this social capital as a signalling device in the market.
Power and consumption choices
The 'weapons' of consumers are first and foremost monetary ones. But money does not equal power. Money can be the incentive to induce a certain course of action. Only power can make an offer that 'one cannot refuse'. Strictly speaking, money can only be used to reward, but not to punish; it is an instrument of positive, not of negative sanctioning. The consumer can reward a certain company and buy its products. She can also threaten not to buy a certain product, but cannot expect that threat to have a big effect in a mass market. That raises the question of what kind of power the consumer actually has in the market. Is it sociologically sound to speak of power at all in this case? This is not the place to embark on a detailed discussion of power as a sociological concept (cf. Clegg 1989; Lukes, 1974; Stewart, 2001; Wrong, 1979) . Despite various efforts to define and clarify the concept and numerous applications, not too much has changed since Dahl's characterization of the study of power as a 'bottomless swamp' (Dahl, 1957: 201) . However, the concept's amorphous nature and its conceptual history are in some important ways pertinent to our discussion of consumer power. The sociology of power has come a long a way since Weber's rather one-sided systematization of the subject. For Weber and still for many theorists today, the essence of power lies in the chance to assert and carry out one's will in a social relationship even against resistance (Weber, 1980: 28) . This is on the one hand a very inclusive definition of power that, for instance, leaves entirely open on what the 'chance' is based. Yet on the other hand it restricts power to the intentional acts of individuals who first have to formulate their 'will' in order to then explicitly 'assert' it. That power does not always take the form of obvious and intentional acts but may also occur in the form of non-decisions or as structural power was an early and necessary correction to this bias (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974) .
The most recent and possibly last step in this development toward a more encompassing notion of power was taken by Michel Foucault. Through his studies on power and discipline (Foucault, 1973; 1983) he developed a conception of power as a pervasive feature of sociality. According to Foucault, power is 'present at every level of the social body ' (1979: 141) and 'employed and exercised through a net-like organisation ' (1980: 98) . Inasmuch as such statements postulate that power does not 'belong' to anyone, it is in line with a nonindividualistic conception of power as being embedded in social relations. Yet Foucault went further than seeing power as embedded in social relations and regarded it as constitutive of social relations per se. For instance, regarding power and knowledge, Foucault arrived at such a close connection between the two that they became almost indistinguishable:
'power/knowledge' (Foucault, 1980) . It necessarily becomes difficult to distinguish the effects of power from other factors with such a generalized understanding of the term. Within a Foucauldian framework it becomes almost trivial to state that 'money is power', if power as discursive practice is all but synonymous with selectivity as such.
Although power is not selectivity per se, it has very much to do with the transfer of selectivity.
From Weber to Dahl there is much agreement that power implies some kind of influence of one element on another. This can be turned into a theory of social power relations if we conceive power as a medium that interrelates two sets of selections, namely the selection of a two interdependent courses of action (Luhmann, 1988b) . Power enables the 'power holder' to define a social situation so as to turn it into a decision between a desired course of action (i.e. the power holder's plan of action) and an alternative, undesired option (i.e. the use of some sort of sanctions). Neither side in a power relationship wants the undesired alternative to happen. The one who is subject to power clearly does not want to face the negative sanctions; but if sanctions have to be used the power holder, too, does not get what she aimed for.
Instead, she has to use force, execute a punishment or the like. Of course, the power holder should have fewer problems with such a development -that is why she is more likely to get what she wants in the first place (Luhmann, 1988b; 2000: Ch. 2). For example, consumers can 'punish' a company that does not live up to their expectations through a boycott of its products. But then they have to do without those particular products. They will not get what they originally aimed for -the product and the correct behaviour -but at least for some period of time, they will get neither.
In this very simple case of a consumer boycott the sanction is not used to threaten and thus to induce a certain course of action, it is merely used as a form of punishment. That is because the negative sanctions are 'parasitic' upon a prior allocation of positive sanctions: consumers refuse to buy a brand or a product that they used to buy.
1 Positive sanctions are then transformed into negative ones because the expectation to receive certain rewards or payments is disappointed (Luhmann, 1987) . However, positive sanctions may also be used 1 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between power and positive/negative sanctions see Holzer and Sørensen (2003) .
directly to induce a desired course of action. All they require are resources -usually economic ones -that can be deployed to reward a specific behaviour. Thus political consumers and investors can use their financial resources to acquire products or shares that they regard as compatible with their environmental, social and ethical preferences. To perceive those activities as positive sanctions they must be large enough to warrant a change or at least a confirmation of behaviour. This may result from an aggregation of individual preferences and decisions. The potential market is perceived as an opportunity by business.
Companies may thus decide to provide the apparently demanded range of products and services. This again means better opportunities for buying these products and therefore a bigger demand and so on.
Even without the threat of boycotts, there can be no doubt that the potential for positive sanctions encapsulated in the 'purchasing power' of consumers can induce change in the economy. Money may not make the world go round, but it certainly is a potent tool to establish a social relation in which 'A gets B to do something he would not otherwise do': to sell him something (Baldwin, 1971: 582) . However, there is also an important restriction.
Purchasing power usually serves to facilitate exchange. If A pays for something, that makes it more likely that B will tolerate A's taking possession of it. Yet it is far more demanding to get B to actually do something (rather than to just tolerate A's actions) merely on the basis of 'purchasing power'. Common sense has a lot to say about all those things 'money can't buy'.
Amongst those is the capacity to actually ensure that a particular course of action will take place. Money is only an offer one cannot refuse if one does not have any. We should therefore regard 'purchasing power' based on money as a rather restricted and derived form of power.
Since it mainly operates on the basis of positive inducements, it depends on options already available (thus echoing the aforementioned characterization of consumption as 'lack of choice').
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But if we talk about the power of consumption, we are not necessarily concerned with the individual consumer. The power behind political consumption cannot be understood in individualistic terms. It is not the power of the individual consumer, but the power of agencies that command enough credibility to influence many people's decisions and to catalyze 'individualized collective action' (Micheletti, 2003: 24ff.) . Social movements in particular are thus the transmission belts for the effective translation of monetary resources into political 2
It is thus clear that we cannot fully concur with Fiske's argument: 'If money is power in capitalism, then buying, particularly if the act is voluntary, is an empowering moment' (Fiske, 1991: 26). power. Under certain circumstances, social movement organizations can claim to be able to influence the decisions of consumers and thus 'borrow' their purchasing power. They can then use this as a threat, i.e. as a potential negative sanction, against business. To understand how that particular power is established, however, we need a clearer understanding of the mechanism that makes individualized collective action possible. In the following, I shall unpack this mechanism in more detail. I argue that rather than being the solution, individualization is the first serious obstacle to political consumption.
Individualization: the privatization of economic choice
The role sets of movement participants and the more general public play a decisive role in the transmission of the political and other concerns into economic decisions. A modern individual is usually a member of both worlds: of the economy as a consumer and of the polity as either an active politician or as a more passive voter. And besides the two, she also regularly participates in a range of other subsystems of society, such as the legal system, religion, education, sports and so on. 3 In modern society, individuals are therefore not members of one and only one particular segment, sphere or system of society but always participate in many of them. At least since Simmel's work on social circles (Simmel, 1989 (Simmel, [1890 ) sociologists routinely locate the individual at the 'intersection' of the differentiated spheres or subsystems of modern society. Individuality, then, consists of the specific pattern of multiple yet always partial inclusions into a variety of subsystems and subgroups. If one looks for a transmission belt between economic and political processes, the individual and his or her role set combining roles from both spheres may thus be a good starting point.
This fact has of course been noted with regard to political consumerism. Scholars speak of its potential to 'cross' or even 'erase' the boundaries between economic and political action on the one hand and the private and the public on the other (Micheletti, 2003: 4f., 2) . In a similar vein, the political consumer is supposed to reunite the Mr Jekyll and Dr Hyde of modernity:
the bourgeois and the citoyen (Sørensen, 2001) . The very term implies that political consumption combines two logics of action. Yet that does not mean that the logics therefore disappear or blend into one another entirely. In my view, such statements gloss over the delicate balance that political consumerism has to strike with the functional differentiation of modern society. Like similarly 'de-differentiating' activities such as environmental teaching, 3
For the implied theory of functional differentiation of society see Luhmann (1977a; 1982; 1997: Ch. 4) .
religious research or scientific politics, political consumption has to deal with the demands of at least two different societal spheres. Their separation is not cancelled out once and for all:
The religious scientist will have two audiences instead of only one to satisfy, each according to their respective criteria; and the political consumer has a financial budget that cannot be topped up by doing politics alone. The 'de-differentiation' inherent in such cases is first and foremost a combination, maybe even a temporary blending, of roles. Role structures are of course an important element of the differentiation of subsystems such as politics and the economy. However, there is a significant difference whether the roles concerned are what sociologists refer to as 'professional' roles or 'complementary' roles.
The distinction between professional and complementary roles is essential in order to understand the interlock between inclusion and functional differentiation. 4 Professional roles (sometimes also referred to as performance roles) such as politician, entrepreneur, doctor, teacher or scientist emerge around the highly specialized and visible tasks that represent a subsystem's function in society. Therefore, they come to mind first when one is asked to specify the human resource basis of functional subsystems. However, professional roles also The distinction was introduced by Nadel (1957) . My application here derives from its integration into the theory of functional differentiation (cf. Luhmann and Schorr, 1979: 29ff.; Stichweh, 1994) .
guided by medical concerns alone. For reasons of inclusion and differentiation the institutionalization of professional and complementary roles is therefore indispensable.
Regarding the question of blending roles, there is an important asymmetry between professional and complementary roles. It should be obvious that the transfer of evaluative and motivational criteria from one role context to another is a problem in a functionally differentiated society based precisely on the separation of role contexts. Accordingly, it is usually an important element of the norms of a professional role not to let other roles interfere with it. The scientist would be a bad scientist indeed if she decided to oppose a theory because of political loyalties or religious beliefs, or because her husband does not like its implications.
Undue transfers between a professional role and other roles are often deemed 'corrupt' and thus inhibited. This is possible because we usually only hold one professional role at any given time. Therefore we are by and large able to submit to the special -and sometimes exceedingly demanding -requirements regarding the isolation of our professional role from other roles. The situation is entirely different, however, for complementary roles. For anyone can and usually will occupy more than one of them. Despite some anxieties on the part of some critical observers of modern culture, individuals do not usually 'compartmentalize' their own identity according to their various roles. 5 Rather, the concentration of a variety of complementary roles in one person tends to crosscut the fault lines of functional differentiation. The surprisingly simple solution to this conundrum is the privatization of decisions in complementary roles. 6 More and more of the decisions associated with complementary roles -as consumer, patient, believer etc. -are socially neutralized by declaring them private. Consequently, also the personal pattern of interference between roles becomes a matter of legitimate private choice: Of course, we can 'consume according to religious conviction or cast our vote on the basis of aesthetic criteria' (Beyer, 1990: 376) , but such combinations are relegated to the realm of individual choice and therefore publicly neutralized.
5
Watching an interview with the coach of the German Olympic female hockey team at the time of writing, I came across a prime example of role isolation. The coach is also the partner of one the players, but strictly separates his professional role from his partnership role. When the two leave for a tournament or a training camp together, they nonetheless say goodbye to each other -and only 'see' each other again (as lovers) when the professional interlude is over. Some observers might regard this as an exaggerated case of compartmentalization, but it obviously is a working solution to an inevitable problem.
6
The sketched theory of privatization was first developed with regard to religion, but it can be easily generalized (Beyer, 1990; Luhmann, 1977b: 232ff.) .
The privatization of our decisions as consumers (and as believers, patients and even, to some degree, voters) ties in well with individualization. It thus appears that precisely through the highly personal pattern of interference between complementary roles, the individual displays something like an identity. However, this pattern cannot be imposed onto others without violating their respective rights to follow their own pattern of interference. Effectively, the mere postulation of an individualized pattern of decision-making is enough to achieve that the communication of individual choices cannot demand to be binding for others anymore.
Collectivization: role mobilization and social movements
The individualization achieved by the privatization of decision-making is however not irreversible. But it needs a 'collectivizing' agent to make patterns of interferences communicable. Here, I want to argue, lies the significance of social movements for political consumerism. Generally speaking, the characteristic modus operandi of new social movements can be fruitfully analysed using the concepts of role theory. 7 It has often been noted that new social movements, unlike 'classic' movements such as the labour movement, do not primarily seek to seize state power. Rather, they strive for a more indirect influence on the political centre from the fringes. Quite aggregated descriptions of this process in terms of 'identity' or 'cultural politics' prevail in the literature (Nash, 2000: Ch. 3; Stewart, 2001: Ch. 8 ). Rather to invoke the sociologically amorphous placeholders of culture and identity, one might just as well say that new social movements do not address their audience only in their political roles (i.e. as voters or politicians) but as persons including their other roles as well.
To be receptive to the claims of the environmental movement does not merely mean to vote for the Greens but also to pay attention to environmental criteria in other areas of everyday life -as a consumer, of course, but for instance also as a mother, as a scientist, or even as a believer.
It is far from obvious that such an overarching determination of behaviour in various contexts should exist in modern society. As mentioned above, such an endeavour seems to run counter to functional differentiation as a basic parameter of modern society. We have seen that the privatization of role interferences prevent them from gaining any public relevance. Infusing one's consumption choices with religious concerns or one's voting behaviour with economic 7
Although seldom couched in role terms, the much quoted relationship of new social movements to 'identity issues' appears to relate to the same feature (amongst many others see Buechler, 1995; Castells, 1997; Eder, 1993; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Melluci, 1989) .
considerations thus becomes a matter of personal choice that does not lead to dededifferentiation beyond one's own role set. In order to transcend the limits set by privatization role interferences need to be amplified, aggregated and communicated. In other words, they have to be collectivized so that they become a societal fact instead of an individual quirk. That is exactly what social movements and their organizations can achieve.
The collectivization of private choice involves a particular kind of mobilization that has not been the focus of social movement research so far. The reason for this is an underdeveloped concept of movement participation. When it comes to any kind of social aggregate, be it a group, organization, movement or society as a whole, many sociologists still conceive of its elements in terms of human beings. Nothing seems to be more obvious than that a group consists of people. It is however clear that those 'people' are not physical, palpable entities but social abstractions and constructions. An organization does not consist of the arms and legs or the digestive and thought processes of human beings, but of members whose membership makes them accountable to the organization in some aspects of their personality.
8
The same goes for participation or membership in social movements. It is not evident that and why movements participants should engage their whole personality in movement activities.
They might as well regard it as just another role that is occasionally relevant. Yet successful social movements -and political consumerism is a prime example -manage to prevent such a compartmentalization of movement participation.
Nothing could capture better how new social movements have tried to achieve that than the well-known 1960s slogan that 'the personal is political'. One way to understand it is that the private realm should not be exempt from public scrutiny, for instance regarding standards of gender equality. By providing a common language to communicate grievances, social movement activity may accordingly appear to turn 'private troubles into public problems' (C.
W. Mills, quoted in Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 56 ). Yet it is equally plausible to regard it as turning public problems into private troubles, since it urges individuals to regard their everyday private life as the appropriate turf to introduce social change. Considering the circularity of grievance recognition and claims making, it is in most cases hard to say whether the grievances or the claims came first. At any rate, to put the question this way ignores an important insight of social movement theory: that the emergence of movements cannot be explained solely with reference to primary grievances that are then taken up by social 8
The informative exception may be the total institutions depicted by Goffman (1961) .
movements. Social movements are not a function of extant, objective social problems or grievances. Social problems themselves are the result of social construction and attribution (Gusfield, 1989; Kitsuse and Spector, 1973; Spector and Kitsuse, 1973) . And yet their (social) existence alone cannot explain if and when social movements arise. Rather, such an explanation must be based on the available human and organizational resources that determine mobilization ('mobilizing structures'), the political and legal contexts and their conduciveness to social movement activities ('opportunities'), and the interpretation and definition of instances of grievances or threat ('framing processes') (McAdam et al., 1996;  see also McAdam et al., 2001 ).
Political consumerism and some other new social activities, too, combine those factors to a process that could be referred to as role mobilization. It involves, first, a specific kind of 'resource mobilization' (cf. McCarthy and Zald, 1977 ) that relies on the financial resources and social capital of potential movement participants, i.e. their purchasing power and their entanglement in various role contexts. Second, it depends on a reasonably affluent social environment to provide an opportunity structure in which consumers make recurring choices between different and to some extent substitutable commodities. And third, it needs to legitimize the de-dedifferentiation of roles so that movement participants can account for their sometimes unusual blurring of role boundaries, for instance, if spending more on an environmentally sound commodity needs to be justified against a restricted budget or other money-spending opportunities.
Financial and social capital as well as choice opportunities abound in affluent western market economies. Therefore the most critical task for the collectivization of political consumption through social movements is the appropriate 'framing' (Benford, 1997; Benford and Snow, 2000; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986) . To construct a social problem means to put a topic on the public agenda so that both movement participants and 'outsiders' can relate to a set of issues (Luhmann, 1996) . That requires two interdependent framing tasks to be accomplished: First, new claims should be related to an existing pool of knowledge. This is achieved by successful 'frame alignment processes'
between movement claims and common-sense or individual interpretations, for instance by processes of frame bridging, amplification, extension or transformation. 9 Second, a rationale 9
Frame bridging involves the linkage of a focal frame to an ideologically similar pool of sentiments, for instance, an environmental movement that successfully appeals to religiously minded people with a claim to preserve biodiversity. Frame amplification is the clarification of a specific frame by stressing certain of its for action should be given. Mobilization will depend on (1) diagnostic framing, i.e. the identification of a problem, including the attribution of blame and causality; (2) prognostic framing, i.e. the proposal of solutions and possible actions to achieve it; (3) motivational framing, i.e. a call for action, including selective incentives for the participants (Snow and Benford, 1988: 199-204) . The upshot of these distinctions is that the successful framing of a movement issue inevitably establishes it within accepted frameworks of knowledge, both personal and social.
Albeit a detailed discussion of the various tactics would require looking at a specific campaign and is thus beyond the scope of this paper, certain general features of political consumerism can be noted. First, frame transformation is central to political consumption. By providing an explanatory framework that translates individual acts into public consequences, the shopping situation is transformed. Even if they have not heard about 'life politics' or 'subpolitics' many shoppers today interpret the choice faced in the supermarket differently.
Second, frame bridging utilizes that there is often more than one unambiguous reason to select or avoid a certain product. Campaigns are therefore most successful if they are not confined to one set of criteria. A good example is the combination of gender and Third World issues in the Nestlé Infant Formula campaign (Gerber, 1990; Micheletti, 2003: Ch. 2; Sethi and Post, 1979) . Third, the mobilization through prognostic and motivational framing is selfenforcing if campaigns are successful. The promise that individual shopping can 'make a difference' becomes plausible with effective campaigns, which in turn are more likely to happen if the prognostic and motivational frames of political consumerism are accepted. In terms of motivation the question of possible disincentives appears to be more crucial than the one of incentives. For instance, products of 'Fair Trade'-schemes are often more expensive than normal ones. Past experience has shown that those price differences often prevent commodities associated with political consumerism from achieving larger market shares (for the case of coffee see Transfair and RUGMARK, 2001) .
inherent values or beliefs. The women's movement, for example, elaborated the value of equality as a vehicle of amplification. Frame extension means to widen the focus of the primary framework to include other aspects. For instance, many environmental movements in the 'Third World' include development into the frame of nature conservation in order to adapt to local priorities. Frame transformation is the reinterpretation of known facts and events within a new framework. Workers, for instance, were able to interpret their relationship to employers in a different way by using a Marxist frame of 'exploitation' rather than one of a patron-client relationship (Snow et al., 1986: 467-476) .
Successful framing makes it more likely that new consumers 'join' the political consumerism movement and adjust their actions accordingly. In the terminology suggested here that means that participants accept the movement's topic(s) as relevant and informative to all segments of their life. By thus giving priority to their movement identity, political consumers can turn their consumer role into a conductor for political programmes. From their perspective, the frames of political consumerism in general and specific campaigns in particular make it sensible to include consumption choices in the repertoire of legitimate and necessary movement activities. Considering the priority of individualization (grounded in the differentiation of role structure), it might therefore be more appropriate (though a bit more awkward) to speak of 'collectivized individual action' than the other way round.
From the perspective of social movements, individual consumers 'lend' their purchasing power to them and thus enable them to establish effective threats on the marketplace. Social movement organizations (SMOs) can then collectivize patterns of role interference so as to generalize their influence on the consumption choices of their participants to a level that permits them to put pressure on producers. One could also say that SMOs administer part of the purchasing power of their adherents. If not actual money, then at least a good deal of power is thus transferred onto them. 10 It makes sense for the individual to lend support to an organization if that appears to be an effective venue for collective action. The organization, after all, can exercise much more power than any particular individual -and sometimes even more than the actual 'sum' of power. Since we are not talking about the measurable purchasing power of political consumers but rather about the derived social power, there is no objective measuring rod. Accordingly, the potential for both appeal and threat is greatly expanded. SMOs can use their access to their adherents' role structures as a basis for both positive and negative sanctions: They can either threaten to mobilize against a certain product or company (for instance through a boycott call) or they can lend their credibility to labelling schemes that subject products to scrutiny according to the presumed preferences of consumers.
10
It is not coincidental that we speak of members or adherents lending support to a cause or an organization. As sociologists and political scientists observed, there is an interesting parallel between lending political support and depositing money in a bank (Baldwin, 1971; Parsons, 1963; 1969) . Just like a bank can use its customers' money to either make own investments or grant loans to other customers, a political group can use its 'borrowed' support to wield power and authority.
The efficacy of political consumption in the market
There are plenty of reasons for the individual to use economic decisions as an outlet for political motives, i.e. to regard consumption as part of the political 'repertoire' (Stolle and Hooghe, 2003) . Not only is there a remarkable strucural homology between democratic elections and consumptions choices. Apologists of the market system in western countries do not tire of advertising it as a kind of 'economic democracy' (Burke, 1996: 127) , in which the consumer is the sovereign. 11 Moreover, the distinction between professional and audience roles also applies to political inclusion. Most people's participation in politics is limited to the complementary role of the 'voter' who regularly goes to the ballot box, where only periodic, summary decisions about whole political agendas are possible. In contrast, the act of shopping allows for the timely expression of highly specialized and individualized preferencesincluding aesthetic, religious and political ones. For the individual consumer, political consumption thus appears to be an appropriate and usually not very time-consuming valve to express political and other motives.
Yet how do such 'politically' minded decisions affect the producers? Political consumers seek to effect change 'through the marketplace' (Friedman, 1999) wants' are not that trivial. To make sense of empirical phenomena, equilibrium models of supply and demand are not very helpful. Rather, markets must be conceived as social structures exhibiting a historically shaped configuration of roles (Leifer and White, 1987; White, 1981a; 1981b; . In actual markets, producers cannot observe aggregate measures of demand. They can only operate on the basis of tangible observations of the consequences of their own and their competitors' actions. The motives of consumers and their individual preferences, however, are usually unknown. Even if they were known they can seldom be related to concrete production schedules. Yet for a winery, for instance, it is not of much value to know that dry wine is popular; is needs to know how much wine can then be 11
In some countries, though, the interpretation is more aristocratic. In Germany, for instance, the principle that the customer is always right translates as 'Der Kunde ist König' (the customer is king).
sold (Luhmann, 1988a: 108) . The requisite demand curves, however, belong to a 'mythical information setting' (Leifer and White, 1987: 86) which producers see themselves, not consumers' (White, 1981b: 543f.) .
Against this backdrop, political consumption enters the picture as a highly instructive device for corporations to peek behind the mirror of the market. While normal consumption provides only few clues as to the preferences behind it and how they could affect production schedules, political consumption -combined with public mobilization -makes that part of the market temporarily transparent. As we have seen, political consumerism as a social movement serves to collectivize and publicize the individualized choices of consumers. SMOs act as 'signifying agents' (Snow and Benford, 1988: 213) : They transform part of the micro-diversity of individual consumption choices into a condensed signal that can be communicated and used in the marketplace. They thereby introduce an element of what Hirschman (1970) calls 'voice' into the market context (cf. Pestoff, 1988) . Where the individual consumer can only choose between 'exit' and 'loyalty', i.e. to either stop or continue buying a certain product, the consumer associations and other SMOs can turn this decision into a public statement.
Private choice thus becomes an instrument of public influence. This is the reason why the rhetoric of political consumption is not completely adversarial but also includes win-win scenarios. Those producers who are willing to adjust themselves to the particular niche of political consumption can benefit from substantial information advantages.
For instance, they can participate in labelling schemes to send positive signals toward a consumer group with a particular interest; they can then derive the necessary adjustments directly from the labelling scheme's prescriptions and do not need to second-guess the individual standards of consumers. Taking the standards of such labels as a guideline may not only facilitate 'ethical' decisions in a company (cf. Davies and Crane, 2003) , but also makes it easier to arrive at an informed decision about production schedules in the first place. Far from being just a nuisance, political consumption can therefore be useful for producers to shed light on the otherwise impenetrable motives of consumers. However, the variety of labelling schemes may cause orientation problems both for consumers and producers. One solution is the formal legalization of labels, but even then differences between national regulations remain (for the case of food-labelling see e.g. Boström and Klintman, 2003) . Again, SMOs often play an important role in transnational diffusion processes that may lead to a greater degree of harmonization (Kern et al., 2001) . signalling device of actual and possible market development and help producers to identify new niches beyond the reproduction of established structures of competition.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have sketched elements of a theory of political consumption that takes into account the specific obstacles and opportunity structures of a modern, functionally differentiated society. The power of consumption cannot be understood in individualistic terms. In modern society, decisions associated with 'complementary roles' such as being a voter, consumer or believer become increasingly privatized in order to defuse the dededifferentiating potential of role interference. This makes it a matter of individual disposition to apply religious criteria to one's voting behaviour, or political ones to one's shopping. Political consumerism sheds temporary light on the world behind the mirror of the market.
Essential to achieve that are the signalling activities of social movement organizations that serve to make individual consumption choices appear as collective action. By indicating potential demand, political consumerism can thereby facilitate changes in the role structures and niches occupied by producers that would otherwise be unlikely to emerge. By modulating and expanding the consumer role, however, that also makes it more difficult for firms to base their decisions on clearcut economic concerns alone and thus introduces a new element of uncertainty. The regulation of product quality standards and voluntary labelling schemes mitigate the resulting information problems to some extent. To get a clearer picture of their risks and chances producers are likely to spend more time and effort on consumer research in critical market segments in the future (and, possibly, to show more interest in empirical research on political consumerism). That could however also be a risk for the hitherto successful signalling activities of consumer associations and other SMOs. After all, the closer look at the (statistical) individual consumer may well reveal that many consumers show little consistency in their consumptions patterns. The political consumer may at times also be an aesthetic, a religious, or just a thrifty consumer. Yet as long as the the agents of political consumerism can credibly claim to be able to mobilize their adherents' role sets even occasionally, they will exercise considerable influence in the markets.
